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DNA fingerprinting of Mycobacterium tuberculosis—a relatively new laboratory technique—offers promise
as a powerful aid in the prevention and control of tuberculosis (TB). Established in 1996 by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Tuberculosis Genotyping and Surveillance Network
was a 5-year prospective, population-based study of DNA fingerprinting conducted from 1996 to 2000.
The data from this study suggest multiple molecular epidemiologic and program management uses for
DNA fingerprinting in TB public health practice. From these data, we also gain a clearer understanding of
the overall diversity of M. tuberculosis strains as well as the presence of endemic strains in the United
States. We summarize the key findings and the impact that DNA fingerprinting may have on future
approaches to TB control. Although challenges and limitations to the use of DNA fingerprinting exist, the
widespread implementation of the technique into routine TB prevention and control practices appears sci-
entifically justified.
he capacity to differentiate Mycobacterium tuberculosis
strain patterns by DNA fingerprinting has shown promise
in tuberculosis (TB) control since this tool was first applied to
outbreak investigations (1–3) and population-based studies
(4,5) in the early 1990s. Evaluating this tool and determining its
limitations are important activities in view of the most recent
efforts to eliminate TB in the United States after its resurgence
in the early 1990s (6).  In 1996, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) initiated a 5-year, prospective, popula-
tion-based study, the National Tuberculosis Genotyping and
Surveillance Network. Most findings represented in this issue
of Emerging Infectious Diseases come from this study. In this
synopsis, we address two important implications for DNA fin-
gerprinting of M. tuberculosis: its varied utility as a tool in TB
prevention and control and its value in the measurement of the
overall diversity of M. tuberculosis strain patterns in the United
States, including differences by region and population and the
prevalence of endemic strains.
Identification of Laboratory 
Cross-Contamination or Mislabeling
DNA fingerprinting of M. tuberculosis has been shown to
identify and confirm laboratory cross-contamination or misla-
beling. Previous retrospective studies describing M. tuberculo-
sis laboratory cross-contamination or mislabeling found rates
between 0.9% and 3.5% (7–14). In this issue, Northrup et al.
(15) report a rate of 1.5%, which is within the range of pub-
lished rates. Therefore, of 13,035 culture-positive TB case-
patients reported in the United States in 2000, TB may have
been misdiagnosed in as many as 117 (0.9%) to 456 (3.5%)
persons. Using the previously reported finding that two thirds
of case-patients with false-positive cultures are treated (11),
we estimate that 78–304 persons may have been misdiagnosed
and treated unnecessarily in the United States in 2000.
To measure the direct and indirect financial costs associ-
ated with these laboratory cross-contamination or mislabeling
events, Northrup et al. (15) discuss data about three persons
who were falsely diagnosed as having TB. In 1999 U.S. dol-
lars, the estimated average cost to the health-care system for
each person was $32,231 and the estimated average direct cost
for each person was $10,744; thus, the estimated average cost
for misdiagnosis of TB was $42,975 per person. This study did
not include indirect and intangible costs, which can be sub-
stantial and are largely paid by the patient. Therefore, these
costs are underestimates of the true costs associated with these
events. Extrapolating these cost estimates to the national level
and assuming that 78–304 persons were misdiagnosed and
treated in 2000, we estimate that the preventable costs to the
U.S. health-care system were $3.35 million to $13.06 million
in 2000.
To examine the potential to predict laboratory cross-con-
tamination or mislabeling, Jasmer et al. (16) established repro-
ducible and predetermined criteria on the basis of DNA
fingerprinting. They prospectively reviewed these events in
three large, experienced laboratories in California. Laboratory
procedures were reviewed at the start of the study; culture-pos-
itive results for 6 (2%) of 296 persons were caused by labora-
tory cross-contamination, which could be identified a priori. In
this study, five of the six persons received unnecessary, expen-
sive, and potentially dangerous medical treatment. *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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Monitoring Interjurisdictional Transmission
The impact of epidemic spread of TB across state or juris-
dictional boundaries and the necessity for interjurisdictional
public health collaboration are not always fully accepted or
appreciated, due in large part to the constitutionally mandated
independence of state governments for public health practice.
Many reports of localized-only epidemic transmission (17)
suggest that most transmission of TB in the United States
occurs locally. Indeed, Ellis et al. (18) show that most clusters
(66% or 680/1,029) from the National Tuberculosis Genotyp-
ing and Surveillance Network were restricted to a single site.
However, a few recent reports illustrate the importance of
the wider geographic spread of TB and the necessity for inter-
jurisdictional collaboration (19,20). Ellis et al. also show that
260 (25%) clusters from the genotyping surveillance network
were found in two sites, 55 (5%) in three, 19 (2%) in four, 8
(1%) in five, and 7 (1%) in six sites. As expected, clusters that
spanned multiple sites included more case-patients. Maximum
cluster size and absolute numbers of case-patients with isolates
that clustered continued to increase through the end of the study.
Though many of the case-patients in clusters that spanned these
multiple sites may not be epidemiologically linked, other exam-
ples of interjurisdictional transmission exist (19–22).
We know that TB is problematic in certain groups at high
risk (i.e., homeless persons) (23–29). With this in mind, an
exception to the concept of local-only spread is described by
Lathan et al. (30). They present data showing that interjuris-
dictional collaboration in TB control was necessary to control
epidemic spread between adjacent jurisdictions (i.e., Maryland
with Washington D.C.). Through combined DNA fingerprint-
ing cluster analyses, these researchers found additional and
unsuspected TB transmission that not only crossed state lines
but also crossed social lines (i.e., between homeless and non-
homeless persons).
McElroy et al. (31) show the value of a system to compare
DNA fingerprinting data across jurisdictions, especially during
multistate TB outbreak settings. Facilitating an interjuridic-
tional investigation of TB first recognized in Maryland, they
extended the investigation outside of Maryland and discovered
an additional 18 case-patients linked to the original 21 previ-
ously described. 
TB control programs that employ DNA fingerprinting
should work with neighboring jurisdictions to devise strategies
that promote rapid sharing of results. Comprehensive inter-
jurisdictional monitoring of transmission would require a
national registry of DNA fingerprinting data and a system to
alert public health officials about interjurisdictional clustering.
Program Evaluation
Understanding the transmission characteristics of multi-
drug-resistant TB strains is essential for developing successful
control strategies. Multidrug-resistant TB is an important
problem and represents a life-threatening condition; patients
often require prolonged treatment and frequent hospitalization.
The potentially serious side effects of second-line TB drugs
challenge effective treatment and the resources of the patient
and the health-care system (32).
One indicator for the success of a TB control program’s
performance is a decline in TB incidence rate over time. Inci-
dent TB case-patients include those recently infected who
progress rapidly to active TB and those with remote infection
who progress after years of latency and are later diagnosed with
active TB. However, in high transmission circumstances, recent
disease transmission likely accounts for most incident TB case-
patients. DNA fingerprinting clustering may reflect recent TB
transmission (4,5,33,34), albeit with methodological and popu-
lation characteristic caveats (35–37). Therefore, the decline in
the incidence of clustering can indicate the impact of interven-
tions aimed at reducing recent TB transmission (38).
Munsiff et al. (39) describe how DNA fingerprinting, spe-
cifically molecular clustering of multidrug-resistant TB strains
as a surrogate of recent transmission, was used to monitor an
improved TB program in New York City. During a 3-year
period (1995–1997), multidrug-resistant TB was diagnosed for
241 case-patients (4.9% of all culture-positive, TB case-
patients) in New York City. These 241 case-patients were
more likely than culture-positive, non–multidrug-resistant TB
case-patients to have been born in the United States, to be
infected with HIV, to be health-care workers, and to have posi-
tive acid-fast bacilli smear results. During this study period, of
234 multidrug-resistant TB case-patients with DNA finger-
printing results, 153 (65%) were grouped into 19 clusters. Epi-
demiologic links were identified for 25 (19.8%) case-patients
clustered by DNA fingerprinting.
Kong et al. from Denver (40) demonstrate the role of DNA
fingerprinting to measure the performance of a tuberculin
skin-test program among homeless persons. They showed a
decrease in clustering (a surrogate of recent TB transmission)
from 49% during the 7-year period before the program was
implemented to 14% in the 4-year period after the program.
This assessment is a logical extension of the usefulness of
DNA fingerprinting technology, since a previous report from
Denver by Burman et al. (41) showed that homelessness was a
predictor of DNA fingerprint clustering.
Ellis et al. (18) show that, despite a decrease in TB inci-
dence rates at all genotyping surveillance network sites, the
proportion of cases in clusters stabilized at a relatively high
level (~48%). They suggest that this high proportion of cluster-
ing may be due to the inclusion of many low-incidence, stable
populations in which persons in chains of transmission from
past decades still reside in proximity (42). Alternative explana-
tions include a slightly younger population under study, the
presence of old endemic strains that have spread widely, and
the limited discrimination of low-copy number IS6110 restric-
tion fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) patterns, even with
the addition of spoligotyping as a secondary test. Although the
overall proportion of case-patients in clusters plateaued at
approximately 48% over the 5 years of study, the annualized
proportion of case-patients in clusters decreased over time with
a concomitant decrease in TB incidence. This finding, whichTUBERCULOSIS GENOTYPING NETWORK
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might reflect more effective TB control in limiting ongoing
transmission, is provocative and merits further investigation.
Statewide Assessment of Circumstances 
and Settings for TB Transmission
The statewide use of DNA fingerprinting provides an
informed picture of the epidemiologic features of disease
transmission (36–38). Cronin et al. (43) describe a specific
example in Maryland. During a 5-year period, they used DNA
fingerprinting on >99% of all isolates in the state and found
that cluster investigations were very effective in identifying
additional epidemiologic links, many of which occurred in
nontraditional settings. Specifically, isolates from 436 (37%)
of 1,172 Maryland case-patients were clustered by DNA fin-
gerprinting. Of those 436 clustered case-patients, these
researchers found 155 (36%) to be epidemiologically linked
using traditional contact investigation.
Miller et al. (44) provide another example of statewide use
of DNA fingerprinting by exploring the impact of DNA fin-
gerprinting used in Massachusetts during investigations of a
TB outbreak and a laboratory cross-contamination event.
These researchers also describe how DNA fingerprinting
affected the identification of M. tuberculosis strains and trans-
mission sites and accurate epidemiologic links. Overall, they
found that, in addition to 129 epidemiologic relationships
found before DNA fingerprinting results were obtained, 12
other epidemiologic relationships involving 20 persons were
discovered as a result of cluster investigations. In addition,
they determined places of transmission previously unrecog-
nized and used DNA fingerprinting to refute a purported TB
outbreak.
Sharnprapai et al. (45) also report on the use of DNA fin-
gerprinting to further understand the epidemiology and trans-
mission patterns of TB in Massachusetts. In this study, 28% of
TB case-patients were clustered, and case-patients born in the
United States were two times more likely to cluster than case-
patients not born in the United States. Furthermore, they point
out a very important limitation to interpreting and using DNA
fingerprinting data. Despite using a secondary typing method
(spoligotyping) with strains that have six or fewer copies of
IS6110, a limited ability to differentiate these strains exists. In
their study, clusters of strains with more than six copies of
IS6110 were more likely to have epidemiologic links found
than clusters of strains with six or fewer copies of IS6110.
The report by Dillaha et al. (46) describes the subtleties of
disease transmission faced by TB programs in low-incidence
states (specifically Arkansas), which are in the forefront as the
United States moves toward TB elimination. Thirty-five case-
patients in a 54-year period with identical or very similar fin-
gerprints were identified. After reviewing the endemic strain,
these researchers recognized the lack of success with tradi-
tional contact tracing and treatment recommendations for
latent TB infection for persons with positive tuberculin skin
tests. This critical determination has implications for other
low-incidence areas. In addition to the traditional focus on per-
sonal contacts, Dillaha et al. recommend case finding and
screening on the basis of geographic location. With the advent
of geographic interface technology and mapping, this new
public health strategy might be feasible. Additionally, these
findings support the usefulness of a social network approach to
contact investigation.
Outbreak Investigation
The value of DNA fingerprinting has been shown clearly
during outbreak investigations (1–3). During every investiga-
tion, one overriding question recurs: which case-patients
related to the outbreak are part of the chain of transmission and
are not unrelated, sporadic cases? DNA fingerprinting can help
researchers determine whether patients are related to the out-
break and thus focus the epidemiologic investigation.
An intriguing new benefit of coupling DNA fingerprint
information with outbreak investigation lies in the power of
this tool to increase understanding of the often difficult to dis-
cern transmission patterns of community TB disease (47) and
uncover previously unknown outbreaks. Ijaz et al. (48) show
this potential use by demonstrating that molecular clusters
could show previously unsuspected instances of probable TB
transmission, prompting more directed investigations to seek
epidemiologic links missed by routine contact investigation. In
the study, cluster analysis was based on identical and similar
DNA fingerprinting patterns, broadening the group of patients
included in the initial analysis.
In their study, secondary typing was accomplished by
using a polymorphic GC-rich sequence for identical IS6110-
based DNA fingerprinting patterns with six or fewer bands or
for patterns with more than six bands that were similar but dif-
fered by a single band (49). In further investigations of clusters
with this “broader net,” among 66% of case-patients, Ijaz et al.
uncovered additional epidemiologic links missed during rou-
tine contact investigations in Arkansas. During this process,
they found an extensive, previously unknown social network
that aided public health investigations. Ijaz et al. conclude that
patients whose isolates have similar but not identical IS6110
patterns should be considered potential members of a cluster
and be included during epidemiologic investigations.
Oh et al. (50) help establish the value of DNA fingerprint-
ing in an unusual outbreak setting, a zoo. They describe a mul-
tispecies epizootic with genotypically identical M.
tuberculosis strains. Their DNA fingerprint investigation
showed that five of six animals had the identical strain and that
zoo employees with previous negative tuberculin skin tests
were exposed. Skin tests for 55 (18%) of 307 employees were
positive, showing evidence of recent infection.
Bennett et al. (51) present data from the genotyping sur-
veillance network with important policy implications. In addi-
tion to indicating that contact investigation should be extended
to all settings frequented by the source case-patient, they also
showed a significant positive association between being a
smear-negative source case-patient and having unconfirmed
transmission. This finding suggests that the identification of aEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 11, November 2002 1317
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smear-negative source case-patient (as an index case-patient)
should not preclude the ongoing investigation for other possi-
ble sources. They also suggest that transmission from smear-
negative case-patients is not negligible.
Sun et al. (52) report data gathered on transmission of
tuberculosis to children <5 years of age. Representing a senti-
nel health event, thorough investigation of the circumstances
of childhood tuberculosis remains critical to effective public
health practice. They found that routine public health investi-
gations conducted by local health departments, within the
National Tuberculosis Genotyping and Surveillance Network,
identified suspected source patients for 57 (51%) of 111 cul-
ture-confirmed case-patients <5 years of age.  For 8 (15%) of
these 57 patients, DNA fingerprinting suggested infection with
different strains.  These children were more likely to be older
than other children and source case-patients with identical
strains.  The findings in this study highlight the requirement of
rigorous case and contact investigation efforts, especially in
household settings.
DNA Fingerprinting Laboratory Techniques
Other articles in this issue present data that improve our
understanding of both laboratory facets of DNA fingerprinting
(i.e., IS6110 fingerprinting) and basic science of M. tuberculo-
sis. Braden et al. (53) report the results of an external quality
assessment program for the seven network laboratories in
which the interlaboratory reproducibility was measured. They
found that, overall, an exact match was achieved for 73% of
isolates in panels: 90% matched with a one-band difference
and 97% matched with a two-band difference. Although they
report that final outcomes of pattern analysis and cluster deter-
mination in the genotyping surveillance network were proba-
bly closer to reality than the results of this quality assurance
exercise suggest, they also warn that the variability and nonre-
producibility are substantial and should be considered when
interpreting the results from the genotyping surveillance net-
work. Crawford et al. (54) demonstrate through the establish-
ment of the genotyping surveillance laboratory, that DNA
fingerprinting remains an “art,” and the experience and train-
ing of laboratorians are important.
Driscoll et al. (55) describe an evaluation of “logo analy-
ses.” Array-based assays use reverse hybridization.  The
binary nature of array-based assays allows data to be analyzed
usefully with algorithms associated with motif recognition,
such as sequence logo analyses. Logo analyses have the poten-
tial to aid in visualizing and displaying spoligotyping cluster
data and in managing the enormous amount of digital data
generated by large-scale DNA fingerprinting projects. This
potential is especially relevant now because low-incidence
states and countries (including the United States) are consider-
ing universal implementation of DNA fingerprinting of M.
tuberculosis. Using these and other bioinformatic tools, scien-
tists will be able to interpret and understand the data generated
by such a project.
Lok et al. (56) demonstrate that secondary typing methods
(e.g., spoligotyping) should be used when isolates have no
IS6100 insertions (i.e., zero-band strains). This article
describes the differentiation power of secondary typing in
these instances. In a second paper, Lok et al. (57) demonstrate
the use and power of polymerase chain reaction techniques
(e.g., variable number of tandem repeats) to distinguish and
characterize the most common M. tuberculosis strain pattern in
the United States—a two-band IS6110 RFLP pattern repre-
senting 5% of all isolates in the National Tuberculosis Geno-
typing Surveillance Network.
Diversity of M. tuberculosis Strains
The second important implication for DNA fingerprinting
of M. tuberculosis is its ability to measure the overall diversity
of M. tuberculosis strain patterns, including differences within
the United States, differences by region and population, and
prevalence of endemic strains. The genotyping surveillance
network database demonstrated this diversity in the United
States (57). The 10,883 patients in the study represent approxi-
mately 11.6% of all new TB cases in the United States from
1996 through 2000. Through this study, DNA fingerprinting of
10,883 isolates was performed by using the IS6110 RFLP
method, yielding 6,128 distinct patterns.
Cowan et al. (58) report that family analysis of IS6110 pat-
terns revealed 497 patterns related to the W-Beijing family
(19); these patterns represent 946 isolates or 9% of all isolates
in the genotyping surveillance network. Six new families of
related DNA fingerprint patterns were also proposed for iso-
lates containing 6–15 copies of IS6110. These families contain
up to 251 patterns and 414 isolates; together, they contain 21%
of isolates in this copy-number range and may represent
endemic strains distributed across the United States.
The 8,245 isolates with more than six copies of IS6110
yielded 5,640 fingerprint patterns. Of these, 4,846 (86%) were
identified for a single isolate, and 794 patterns grouped 3,399
isolates into fingerprint-defined clusters. Of 457 fingerprint
patterns identified among the 2,507 isolates with low-copy
numbers (six or fewer copies of IS6110), 314 (69%) were
reported for a single isolate, and 143 grouped 2,193 isolates
into clusters. Clustering was much greater among isolates with
low-copy numbers (87%) than among isolates with high-copy
numbers (41%).
Limitations, Challenges, and Future Considerations
The “state of the art” in applied DNA fingerprinting tech-
nology has scientific and molecular limitations, as well as
stumbling blocks to practical use in the field. The lack of
reproducibility of the RFLP DNA fingerprinting technique and
the difficulty in comparing patterns in an RFLP DNA finger-
print database remain important limitations in developing
strategies for universal implementation. The other important
factor related to RFLP is the time required for obtaining
results. In order for DNA fingerprinting to provide value toTUBERCULOSIS GENOTYPING NETWORK
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routine contact investigations, these molecular data must be
available on a timely basis, so that public health intervention
specialists can use them in cluster investigations.
Furthermore, the precision of the interpretation of these
data is evolving. Clustering, by itself and in its entirety, is not
always equivalent to recent transmission; however, a portion
of it is. The limitation of clustering interpretation must be sci-
entifically established, especially if that interpretation is used
as a marker for public health practice performance and as an
indication of progress toward elimination of TB. We know that
the population under study and the length of observation time
play important roles in interpreting this measure. In addition,
the specificity of the clustering case-definition factors into this
equation. Additional investigation into this area is necessary.
How well these research techniques can be expanded to
assist TB control programs is not clear. Laboratory programs
must be established to provide understandable, real-time
results in a manner that influences decisions. The expansion of
these techniques to assist TB control programs holds great
promise. However, cluster investigation must be incorporated
into routine public health practice, including the standardiza-
tion of protocols. TB control officials require further training
to interpret DNA fingerprinting results and act on these results
in an effective way. The National Tuberculosis Controllers
Association, in collaboration with the CDC, is currently draft-
ing a DNA fingerprinting handbook to help health workers in
the field understand and interpret DNA fingerprinting data.
We intend to continue analyses of the National Tuberculo-
sis Genotyping and Surveillance Network data to gain addi-
tional insight into the value of cluster investigations. If DNA
fingerprinting is to be implemented universally, this approach
should be flexible enough to adapt to future laboratory tech-
niques, as they become available. We think that DNA finger-
printing will become an essential tool in investigating TB
transmission in difficult populations and unusual circum-
stances; consequently, DNA fingerprinting will be vital in the
effort to eliminate TB.
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